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Implementation of Article 82 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea: the Challenge
for Canada
Aldo Chircop
1

Introduction

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (LOSC)1 contains
an obscure, unprecedented and unique provision in international law concerning equitable sharing of ocean resources, as follows:
Article 82
Payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
1. The coastal State shall make payments or contributions in kind in
respect of the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. The payments and contributions shall be made annually with
respect to all production at a site after the first five years of production at
that site. For the sixth year, the rate of payment or contribution shall be
1 per cent of the value or volume of production at the site. The rate shall
increase by 1 per cent for each subsequent year until the twelfth year and
shall remain at 7 per cent thereafter. Production does not include
resources used in connection with exploitation.
3. A developing State which is a net importer of a mineral resource
produced from its continental shelf is exempt from making such payments or contributions in respect of that mineral resource.
4. The payments or contributions shall be made through the Authority,
which shall distribute them to States Parties to this Convention, on the
basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and
1 	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982 (adopted
10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994), 1833 UNTS 3 [hereinafter LOSC].
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needs of developing States, particularly the least developed and the landlocked among them.2
After its adoption at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea in 1973–82 (UNCLOS III) the provision hardly received further attention.
This was possibly because the prospects of technological and commercial feasibility of deep sea drilling were remote at the time and the inconvenience
it entailed for domestic revenue generation regimes. It is unprecedented
because it was the first provision in a multilateral treaty to introduce an international royalty on natural resource production within national jurisdiction.
The discourse on equitable sharing of ocean resources was a dominant theme
at UNCLOS III and in subsequent instruments of international environmental law, and currently in the discourse on the conservation of areas beyond
national jurisdiction.3 Article 82 stands out in the discourse on international
equity as it sets out a novel framework for equitable sharing of production
from non-living resources within national jurisdiction.
The literature on the diplomatic history of Article 82 explains how this provision secured a key compromise in the UNCLOS III package deal and needs
no revisit.4 Articles 82 and 76 constituted a quid pro quo.5 There would have
been no agreement on key aspects of Article 76 concerning the extended
continental shelf, i.e., that part of the shelf defined in the LOSC as extending beyond the limits of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and reaching out
seaward to the outer limits of the continental margin, without a counterpart
2 	Ibid, Art 82.
3 	Development of an International Legally Binding Instrument under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine
Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, UN General Assembly Resolution
292 (LXIX), 19 June 2015, available at < https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N15/187/55/PDF/N1518755.pdf?OpenElement>.
4 	SN Nandan & S Rosenne, vol. eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A
Commentary, Vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993), commentary on Part VI, Article 82, at 930–947
[hereinafter Nandan & Rosenne]; RJ Dupuy & D Vignes, A Handbook on the New Law of the
Sea (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1991), 375–381; A Chircop & B Marchand, ‘International Royalty and
Continental Shelf Limits: Emerging Issues for the Canadian Offshore,’ (2003) 26 Dalhousie
Law Journal 273 at 283–293; A Chircop, ‘Operationalizing Article 82 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea: A New Role for the International Seabed Authority?’
(2004) 18 Ocean Yearbook (2004) 395 at 395–412; Issues Associated with the Implementation
of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Technical Study
no. 4 (Kingston, Jamaica: International Seabed Authority, 2009) [hereinafter Chatham House
Report].
5 	Ibid, Nandan & Rosenne, 932.
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agreement on the equitable sharing of non-living resources of the extended
shelf. The compromise was difficult because States enjoying broad margins
(known as margineers) were confronted by land-locked and geographically
disadvantaged States who felt that the margineers’ negotiating position was
being advanced at the expense of the International Seabed Area (the Area).
An earlier United Nations General Assembly resolution had declared the Area
as common heritage of mankind, a unique legal status for the global commons
and not susceptible to appropriation by any State.6 In the event that a natural
resource deposit straddles the extended continental shelf and the Area, further issues arise in the implementation of Article 82.7
Although not a beneficiary of Article 82, the International Seabed Authority
(the Authority), a new intergovernmental organization established by the
LOSC, is a stakeholder of the provision because it is tasked with receiving payments and contributions in kind, developing equitable criteria for distribution
to beneficiaries, and the administration of the funds. The Authority cannot
perform its distributive tasks unless extended continental shelf States perform
their respective responsibilities. Moreover, as the organization with the exclusive mandate for the administration of deep sea mining activities in the Area,
the Authority could conceivably be engaged in dialogue with the coastal State
over resource production and management of non-living resources that straddle the outer limits of the continental shelf and the Area.
Although the deep water market for offshore hydrocarbons is depressed by
prolonged low oil prices, investments are still substantial and driven predominantly by expenditures in Africa and the Americas.8 There are relatively few
activities in the deep waters of extended continental shelves and these include
Angola, Brazil, eastern Canada, northern Norway and the United States’ Gulf
of Mexico. Most activities are prospecting or exploratory in nature. The United
States is not a State Party to the LOSC and to date has not issued discovery
licenses on the extended continental shelf. However, it was the first State to
implement Article 82 in the calls to tender in the Central Gulf of Mexico, by
6 	Declaration on Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, UN General Assembly Resolution 2749
(XXV), 17 December 1970, available at < http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2749.htm>. The
principle was subsequently codified in LOSC, n 1, Art 137.
7 	A Chircop, ‘Managing Adjacency: Some Legal Aspects of the Relationship between the
Extended Continental Shelf and the International Seabed Area,’ (2011) 42 Ocean Development
and International Law 307 at 312–313; Chatham House Report, n 4, 59–63.
8 	For the current state of the deep water industry and forecasts, see: Douglas-Westwood, World
Deepwater Market Forecast 2016–2020 (Kent UK 2016).
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putting bidders on notice that a contingent Law of the Sea Royalty would apply
in the event that the United States became a Party to the LOSC.9 The position
taken by the United States is that bidders require notice of the existence and
contingent application of the Article 82 royalty at the stage of tendering.10
Of more substantial note at this time is Canada’s practice. Canada stands
out as a pioneer State because it is the first LOSC Party to issue discovery
licences, which it has done with respect to developments in the deep waters
off the coast of Newfoundland in the Northwest Atlantic Ocean. If economic
and technical feasibility are confirmed, the licence holders will be expected to
apply for production licences. The prospective issuance of the first production
license will most likely occur before Canada will have defined the outer limits
of its continental shelf in the Northwest Atlantic. Canada ratified the LOSC on
6 November 2003 and on 6 December 2013 made a partial submission to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in accordance with
Article 76 to define the outer limits of the extended continental shelf in the
Northwest Atlantic.11 Under the LOSC, the Commission reviews such submissions and issues recommendations concerning the definition of the outer limit
of the shelf. If Canada receives a positive recommendation, the submission
will add 1.2 million square kilometres of seabed areas to national jurisdiction.
Canada issued the first significant discovery licence to Norwegian company
Equinor (formerly Statoil until 2018) for the Mizzen field on the Flemish Cap,
9 		
For example Stipulation No. 3: Law of the Sea Convention Royalty Payment in
Lease Stipulations, Western Planning Area, Oil and Gas Lease Sale 233, Proposed
Notice of Sale (NOS), BOEM, August 2013, available at <http://www.boem.gov/
Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Regional-Leasing/Gulf-of-Mexico-Region/
Lease-Sales/233/pstips233.aspx>.
10 	‘If the United States becomes a party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (Convention)
prior to or during the life of a lease issued by the United States on a block or portion of a
block located beyond the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and subject to such conditions that the Senate may impose through its constitutional role of advice and consent,
then the following royalty payment lease provisions will apply to the lease so issued, consistent with Article 82 of the Convention …’ Ibid. The United States’ position on the LOSC
is that the bulk of it represents customary international law. However, the characterization of Article 82 as having a contingent application, i.e., if and when the US becomes a
party, suggests that this particular provision might not be considered a customary rule.
11 	Government of Canada, Partial Submission of Canada to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf regarding its Continental Shelf in the Atlantic Ocean: Executive
Summary (Government of Canada, 2013), available at <http://www.un.org/depts/los/
clcs_new/submissions_files/can70_13/es_can_en.pdf>. The Convention entered into force
for Canada on 6 December 2013, 30 days after the deposit of its instrument of ratification
in accordance with LOSC, n 1, Art 308(2). With this partial submission Canada managed
to meet the ten-year deadline for extended continental shelf submissions in accordance
with Annex II, Art (4) on the last day.
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located well beyond 200 nautical miles off Newfoundland.12 In the meantime,
offshore operators have been notified that the boundaries and outer limits of
licences may be reviewed after Canada establishes the outer limits of the continental shelf following recommendations from the CLCS.13
This chapter discusses the issues of implementation of Article 82 for coastal
States with a special focus on Canada against the backdrop of initiatives of
the Authority aimed at clarifying its role and being of assistance to LOSC State
Parties. The chapter starts by discussing the Authority’s initial steps to date
in facilitating the implementation of Article 82 (Section 2), followed by brief
analysis of textual ambiguities and uncertainties and possible interpretations in the first two paragraphs of the provision, as these constitute the core
legal obligation to be implemented by Canada (Section 3). The chapter does
not discuss exemptions for developing States in the third paragraph and the
Authority’s tasks in the fourth paragraph of Article 82. The chapter also considers issues that might arise in a hypothetical situation of production from a
non-living resource straddling the shelf and the Area (Section 4). Thereafter
the discussion moves to the domestic issues confronting the legal, political and
economic mechanics of implementation of the provision in Canada (Section
12

‘Statoil confirms up to 200M barrels at Mizzen prospect’, CBC News, 20 June 2012, available at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/statoil-confirms-up
-to-200m–barrels-at-mizzen-prospect-1.1251285>. In addition to the Mizzen discovery, first
made in 2009, Equinor has four other discoveries in the Flemish Pass off Newfoundland:
Harpoon, A light hydrocarbon discovery in 2013; Bay du Nord, a 2013 discovery estimated
to hold around 300 million barrels of light high-quality oil; Bay de Verde, a light highquality oil discovery in 2016; and Baccalieu, a light high-quality oil discovery in 2016.
See Equinor (Canada), available at <https://www.equinor.com/en/where-we-are/cana
da.html>.
13 	The following caveat was reproduced by the licensing authority for areas off Newfoundland
and Labrador: ‘Any sector, parcel or licence depicted on the following map, (found on
pages 24 and 25), beyond 200 nautical miles off the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador
is not represented by the Board to reflect the full extent of Canada’s continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles. Canada has filed a submission regarding the limits of
the Outer Continental Shelf in the Atlantic Ocean with the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf, the review of which is pending. Any call for bids based on a sector or parcel identified in this map and any licences issued in those areas will be subject
to approval as a Fundamental Decision under applicable legislation. The boundaries of
sectors, parcels or licences in areas beyond 200 nautical miles may be revised to reflect
the limits of the Outer Continental Shelf established by Canada. All interest holders of
production licences containing areas beyond 200 nautical miles may be required, through
legislation, regulation, licence terms and conditions, or otherwise, to make payments or
contributions in order for Canada to satisfy obligations under Article 82 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.’ C-NLOPB 2014–2015 Annual Report, 23, available at <http://www.cnlopb.ca/pdfs/ar2015e.pdf?lbisphpreq=1>.
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5). The chapter concludes with observations on the precedent-setting challenges facing Canada, as the pioneer implementing State, and the Authority in
operationalizing Article 82 (Section 6).
2

The Road to Interpretation

The short and simple text of Article 82 belies the complexity of implementation. The Authority was the first to take initial steps encouraging States to
consider the implementation needs of Article 82. The Authority was wellplaced to take this initiative. The Council and Assembly of the Authority are
empowered by the LOSC to adopt
… rules, regulations and procedures on the equitable sharing of … the
payments and contributions made pursuant to article 82, taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing States and
peoples who have not attained full independence or other self-governing
status …14
The regulatory power of the Council and Assembly is limited, and while the
Authority is in a position to take steps to commence implementation of its
own responsibilities in Article 82, it does not have express power to regulate
the discharge of the obligation by coastal States. However, the respective obligations of the coastal State to make payments or contributions in kind and
the Authority’s responsibility to make arrangements to receive them are intertwined, as will be discussed below.
Using this power, in 2008 the Authority commissioned an expert study
which was tabled for discussion in 2009 at a preliminary meeting of experts
in Chatham House. The meeting was convened to explore and scope out legal
issues of implementation and the role and tasks of the Authority.15 The meeting

14 	The Council is empowered to make recommendations to the Authority to adopt rules,
regulations and procedures, LOSC, n 1, Art 162(2)(o)(i). In turn, the Assembly is empowered to consider and approve them and if it does not it remands them to the Council for
reconsideration in the light of the views expressed by the Assembly. Ibid, Art 160(2)(f)(i).
15 	Draft Paper for Discussion at the Chatham House/International Seabed Authority
Seminar on Issues Associated with the Implementation of Article 82 of the Law of the
Sea Convention, Chatham House, London, 11–13 February 2009, Fourth Draft prepared by
Aldo Chircop.
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resulted in a ground-breaking report.16 The discourse was guided by principles
and rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969,17 the context and purposes of the LOSC, and the understanding on the package deal
reached at UNCLOS III, in particular the relationship between Articles 76 and
82, the relationship between the extended continental shelf and the Area,18
and the powers of the Authority stemming from Articles 82, 160 and 162. The
discourse was also informed by other provisions of the LOSC, including the
duty of States Parties to ‘fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this
Convention’ and to ‘exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized
in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.’19
The meeting report identified several issues and unanswered questions that
coastal States and the Authority would need to address, including clarification
of terminology, the scope of the Authority’s tasks and the relationship between
those coastal States and the Authority in the administration of Article 82.
The report led the Assembly of the Authority to place the study of Article 82 on
the formal programme of work.20 This led to the convening of a larger followup workshop of experts in Beijing in 2012, jointly convened by the Authority
and the China Institute for Marine Affairs of the State Oceanic Administration
of China, and resulted in a second report.21 The workshop had a practical orientation and purposed to produce draft proposals for consideration by coastal
States and the Authority.22 Its conclusions and recommendations setting out

16 	Chatham House Report, n 4. This was accompanied by a second study Non-Living Resources
of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Speculations on the Implementation of
Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Technical Study no. 5
(International Seabed Authority, 2010).
17 	Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969; in force 27 January 1980), UN
Doc. A/ Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
18 	Chatham House report, n 4, 12–13, 21–24.
19 	
L OSC, n 1, Art 300.
20 	Report of the Secretary-General in International Seabed Authority, Selected Decisions and
Documents of the Sixteenth Session (26 April-7 May 2010), (Kingston, 2010), para 75, available at <http://www.isa.org.jm/en/documents/publications>.
21
Implementation of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Report
of an International Workshop convened by the International Seabed Authority in collaboration with the China Institute for Marine Affairs in Beijing, the People’s Republic
of China, 26–30 November 2012, ISA Technical Study no.12, at 24, available at <http://
www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Pubs/TS12-web.pdf> [hereinafter Beijing Workshop
Report].
22 	Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article
166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Doc
ISBA/19/A/2, 22 May 2013, 14–15.
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the roadmap for the next steps in implementation were submitted for consideration by the Assembly.23
The Beijing workshop produced several clarifications and recommendations pertinent to the obligation of coastal States. First, coastal States that have
issued or plan to issue offshore licenses for non-living resources on the extended
continental shelf were encouraged to consider and anticipate the implementation needs of Article 82.24 The report suggested that coastal States had an
obligation to notify the Authority ‘of the anticipated date of commercial production’ which, while not an express requirement in Article 82, is a reasonable
implied requirement.25 It should be recalled that the coastal State has a duty
to deposit charts or lists of geographical coordinates of the outer limits of the
extended continental shelf with the Secretary-General of the Authority.26 Also,
the Authority needs to be in a position to receive payments and contributions
in kind from the coastal State.
Second, the report noted that coastal States have the exclusive right to
determine whether the obligation is to be performed through payments, i.e.,
monetary transfers, or contributions in kind, presumably through a portion
of the resource corresponding to the required percentage. However, given
the complexities of managing receipts of contributions in kind first, a problem first identified at the Chatham House meeting, the experts recommended
that States be encouraged ‘to make payments in the interest of simplicity and
efficiency of implementation.’27 It was noted that such a recommendation to
States might have to be made by State Parties to the Convention.
Third, the uncertainly of the terminology of Article 82 led to the recommendation for a more detailed study of key terms as ‘they are used in contemporary
regulatory and industry practices across different jurisdictions.’28 This is important because Article 82 was conceived as a royalty, a type of revenue generation
23 	Outcomes of the International Workshop on further Consideration of the Implementation
of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Doc
ISBA/19/A/4, 6 May 2013.
24 	Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, at 24: ‘The ISA should encourage OCS States, in particular those that are issuing or plan to issue offshore licences for the exploitation of the
non-living resources of the outer continental shelf, to consider and anticipate the implementation needs of Article 82 within their respective jurisdictions.’
25 	Chatham House Report, n 4, at 51; Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, at 22–23.
26 	
L OSC, n 1, Art 84(2).
27 	Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, at 24: ‘OCS States, while enjoying the exclusive choice to
make payments or contributions in kind, should be encouraged to opt only for payments
in the interests of simplicity and efficiency of implementation. It is conceivable that a
SPLOS resolution may be needed to move this recommendation forward.’
28 	Ibid, 24.
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instrument applied to production from natural resources, long discarded in
some jurisdictions, but retained by others like Canada, as will be seen below.
Fourth, given that coastal States making payments or contributions will be
engaged in a long-term relationship with the Authority, the experts recommended a voluntary memorandum of understanding to help structure the
relationship between the two, or a guidance document to provide practical
advice in the implementation of Article 82.29 Experts preferred an informal
and non-binding instrument to a formal instrument, such as an agreement
between a State and an international organization.
Fifth, it was underscored that the term ‘through the Authority’ clearly did
not mean ‘to the Authority’, since the function performed by the Authority is
that of a receiver rather than a collector of the royalty. Clearly, the Authority
needs to have a mechanism for receiving royalties and for distributing them
to beneficiaries designated by the Convention. There would be issues of costs
of administration of the funds that would need to be considered. Further
studies and technical reports would need to be produced by the Authority.
Consideration of the report at the 19th Session in 2013 anticipated continued
discussions within the Authority ‘to achieve a system for the pragmatic and
functional implementation of article 82.’30
The development of regulations for deep seabed mining in the Area occupied much of the Authority’s agenda in recent years and Article 82 was largely
placed on a backburner. Some Member States felt that the Authority should
give priority to its work regarding activities in the Area. However, the annual
reports of the Secretary-General of the Authority consistently reminded
Member States of the organization’s responsibilities in Article 82. At the 21st
Session of the Assembly in 2015, the Beijing meeting of experts was recalled, in
particular the recommendation that a study of terminological issues be undertaken and that the Secretariat hoped to progress that work in 2015, but with
‘respect to the implementation of article 82, paragraph 4, of the Convention’,
29 	Ibid, 24: ‘The ISA should explore further the concept of a Memorandum of Understanding
between an OCS State and the ISA, or a guidance document, and take steps to prepare a
draft for discussion, bearing in mind that such instruments will be essentially voluntary
and aim to provide practical guidelines and advice to assist OCS States in the implementation of Article 82. The content should reflect terminological matters, functions and
tasks, and other appropriate implementation matters discussed in this report. It could
be undertaken in three sections, namely: (a) practical and administrative arrangements;
(b) provisions regarding contributions in kind; and (c) considerations for OCS States to
take into account.’
30 	Press Release, Nineteenth Session Kingston, Jamaica 15–26 July 2013, SB/19/18, 26 July
2013, 10.
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i.e., the Authority’s task in receiving and distributing benefits.31 This suggests
that the Authority was under pressure to limit its work specifically to its own
responsibilities in the provision and less so on those of coastal States. However,
in 2015 the Authority proceeded with the recommendation of the Beijing
Workshop to conduct an expert study of the terminology of Article 82 as used
in the oil and gas industry on a comparative basis in order to help broaden
coastal States’ understanding of the issues. The study was completed in 2016.32
More recently, the Strategic Plan of the International Seabed Authority for
the Period 2019–2023 adopted at the 24th Session of the Assembly includes the
development of equitable sharing criteria for Article 82.33 The ISA’s Finance
Committee observed that the development of the criteria should be undertaken in parallel with the development of equitable sharing of financial and
other economic benefits from activities in the Area to avoid duplication of
work.34
3

Key Terminological Issues of Concern to Coastal States

The ambiguities and gaps in Article 82 posing major challenges to implementation have been studied in the literature and addressed in the Authority’s
technical reports and therefore need not be recounted in detail. Some issues
are purely terminological, whereas others relate to the modus operandi of
implementation and are of potential concern for Canada.
3.1
Paragraph (1)
The paragraph (1) core rule concerning the duty of the coastal State to make
payments or contributions in kind on the production from non-living resources
is clear. That the choice of discharge procedure is the prerogative of the coastal
31 	Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article
166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Doc
ISBA/21/A/2, 3 June 2015, 3.
32
A Study of Key Terms in Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, ISA Technical Study No. 15, authored by W Spicer/E McIsaac, (Kingston, Jamaica:
International Seabed Authority, 2016). The study focused on the use of key terms in the
following jurisdictions, according to whether their revenue generation systems are based
on royalty or taxation regimes: (a) royalty regimes: Australia; Brazil; Canada (Alberta;
Newfoundland and Labrador); Nigeria; and United States; taxation regimes: Norway;
Russian Federation; and United Kingdom [hereinafter Key Terms Report].
33 	Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority relating to the strategic
plan of the Authority for the period 2019−2023, ISBA/24/A/10 (27 July 2018), para 21.
34 	Report of the Finance Committee, ISBA/24/A/6 – ISBA/24/C/19 (13 July 2018), para 27.
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State is also clear. The term ‘contribution in kind’ could give rise to alternative
meanings. The question that arises is whether this term is meant to refer to a
share of the resources or potentially, and more broadly to other contributions
of equivalent value, such as technical assistance, technology transfer, and so
on.35 A recent paper revived an earlier idea by this author that a contribution in
kind could be interpreted to include national official development assistance.36
The deliberations at UNCLOS III suggest that negotiators may have had in
mind a share of the resource, because at the time developing States wanted
to ensure they had access to oil production. The Beijing Workshop appeared to
lean towards an interpretation in favour of a share of the resource.37
Assuming an actual share of the natural resource is the correct legal interpretation of contribution in kind, a related legal, administrative and economic
issue would arise, namely where and when does the Authority take delivery of
the produced resource and who is responsible for the delivery and costs (e.g.,
transportation, brokerage, insurance, etc.)? The Authority is not equipped
with the tools and capacities necessary to handle these administrative tasks.
It is not mandated to raise the funds needed for this purpose and nor is it
authorised to levy an overhead charge or fee.38 The obligation of coastal States
does not expressly extend to anything more than making the contribution in
kind. In any case, if coastal States act on the advice of the Chatham House
and Beijing Workshop reports that payments are easier, more efficient and less
costly to administer, then the vagueness and complexities of in kind contributions would be avoided altogether.
3.2
Paragraph (2)
The major difficulties for coastal State implementation are mostly with
regard to paragraph 2. The general rule in paragraph 2 is that payments
35 	Chatham House Report, n 4, 51–52.
36 	W Spicer, ‘Canada, the Law of the Sea Treaty and International Payments: Where Will the
Money Come From?’ SPP Research Papers vol 8(31) (University of Calgary, 2015), 20.
37 	Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, at 20: ‘When negotiated at the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1973–1982 (UNCLOS III), the intention behind insertion
of contributions in kind was to secure resource access to State Party beneficiaries.’ Also
ibid at 22: ‘The difficulties to be encountered when an OCS State opts to make ‘contributions in kind’ have already been addressed in this report. In addition to those difficulties,
an understanding of what is acceptable as a contribution in kind within the letter and
spirit of the provision is necessary. Discussions in the Working Group proceeded on the
assumption that this phrase refers to a share of the resource, but other possible interpretations were not discussed.’
38 	Chatham House Report, n 4, 37–38; Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, at 23 in relation to
contributions in kind, and suggesting a further study.
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and contributions are to be made annually, subject to a grace period, i.e., a
royalty-free period during the first five years of production, to enable recovery of expenses incurred in bringing the resource to production. On the sixth
year of production, a royalty of one percent applies and will increase by one
percent annually until seven percent is reached on the thirteenth year, and
which will remain the royalty’s ceiling thereafter. The principles behind the
royalty are clear.
Clarity diminishes on a closer look at the details. For example, can the
grace period be interrupted if production is suspended and reactivated on
resumption of production?39 Presumably yes, as a matter of fairness, but this
is a matter of interpretation of text which is not directly on point. What is the
meaning of ‘annually’? Financial years vary by jurisdiction.40 It could refer to
the financial year in the jurisdiction concerned or to the anniversary date of
first production, and if production is suspended the calculation of the year
may have to vary accordingly.
A difficult term is ‘all production’. During negotiations this term appears to
have meant gross production, less any portion of the resource used to enhance
production according to Article 82(2) (e.g., use of the resource for production
of energy for operations, re-injection of gas into a well to enhance production,
flaring for safety purposes, etc.).41 The meaning of all production as gross production was intentional because this approach simplified the royalty and was
a common practice in those jurisdictions deriving royalty-based revenues in
the oil and gas industry. The alternative interpretation of calculating the royalty on the basis of net production would have engaged a complex discussion
of accounting practices that varied significantly among jurisdictions.42 In the
contemporary context of deep water drilling and production, where costs are
significantly higher than offshore production elsewhere, an additional levy to
the applicable royalty or tax regime under national law could impact on the
feasibility of the entire operation. However, this is a domestic concern and it
does not excuse or lessen the international legal obligation.43
39 	Chatham House Report, n 4, 56–57.
40 	Ibid, 32.
41 	Chircop & Marchand, n 4, 297–298; International Law Association, Committee on
the Outer Continental Shelf, ‘Report on Article 82 of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS),’ Rio De Janeiro Conference, 2008, para 2.8, available at <http://www.ila
-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/33>.
42 	MH Nordquist and C-H Park eds, Reports of the United States Delegation to the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Honolulu: Law of the Sea Institute, 1983), 98–99.
43 	Vienna Convention, n 17, Art 27: ‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.’
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The next set of issues in the second paragraph concern the meaning of ‘value
or volume of production at the site.’ Is the value expected to be determined at
the well-head or at the market location at the time the product is sold?44 There
are significant differences between oil and gas because they are transported
and priced differently. While oil may be priced at the well-head, gas tends to
be priced at the point of distribution, which may be at the terminal point of a
pipeline. The reference to ‘site’ adds another layer of ambiguity as it could be
interpreted to mean ‘resource field, geological structure, well site, license area
and a whole development area subject to multiple licenses’.45 Some deposits
may be layered over each other in the same field.
Negotiated through four successive versions of early drafts of the future
LOSC,46 Article 82 was drafted on the basis of information, assumptions and an
understanding of the petroleum industry and government revenue generation
practices of the 1970s. A key assumption was that the first five years constituted
the period for the recovery of developmental costs.47 Today, deep water drilling (on extended continental shelves as compared to shallow inshore waters)
and cost models are riskier and fundamentally different, such that the period
of cost recovery may be significantly longer than the Article 82 grace period.48
Article 82 follows a royalty model.49 The concept of royalty meant essentially
a share of the produced resource to reflect a rent payable to the owner of the
resource. Today government revenue generation in this industry also includes
a range of fiscal tools such as corporate income tax, profit taxes, resource rent
taxes, value-added taxes, excise taxes, etc.50 Revenue generation practices have
44 	Chatham House Report, n 4; 33–34; Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, 20–21.
45 	Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, 21–22. The meaning of site was also discussed at the
Chatham House Workshop. Chatham House Report, n 4, 61–63.
46 	The earlier iterations of Article 82 were contained in the following drafts: ISNT, 1975,
Art 69; RSNT, 1976, Art 70; ICNT, 1977, Art 82. The final text remained largely unchanged in
the following drafts: ICNT Rev 1, 1977; ICNT Rev 2, 1980; Draft Convention (Informal Text),
1980; and the Draft Convention, 1981, which was the last version of the text before the
LOSC was adopted in 1982. Chatham House Report, n 4, 19–20.
47 	Nordquist & Park, n 42.
48 	‘Deep water drilling and production involves long-term, multi-billion dollar projects that
take several years to complete and are less impacted by short-term fluctuations in oil
prices. Offshore operators often have major project budgets for years and most projects are
completed with the anticipation of higher oil prices in the future.’ US Energy Information
Administration, Trends in U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Upstream Costs, March 2016, at 23
<https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/drilling/pdf/upstream.pdf>.
49 	Chircop & Marchand, n 4.
50 	EM Sunley, T Baunsgaard and D Simard, ‘Revenue from the Oil and Gas Sector: Issues and
Country Experience,’ (World Bank, 2002), 2, available at <http://siteresources.worldbank
.org/INTTPA/Resources/SunleyPaper.pdf>; J Mintz and D Chen, Capturing Economic
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made fundamental shifts, with some jurisdictions moving away from royaltybased levies in favour of taxation-based regimes, such as major petroleum
producing States Norway and the United Kingdom.51 Revenue is thus generated in more complex ways than, or instead of, royalties. Others, like Canada
and the United States, have retained royalties side-by-side other fiscal tools.52
Naturally, Article 82 is a levy on the production of the resource and not on
the entirety of the revenue generated by the operation. This is important to
note as the producer may significantly enhance the original product to produce by-products. Even so, for those jurisdictions where royalties are no longer
levied, there is concern regarding how the payments to be made through the
Authority are to be generated. Thankfully, the latter is not a Canadian problem,
but Canada has other, perhaps more complex domestic issues to navigate.
4

Production from Resources Straddling the Outer Limits

The LOSC does not require a coastal State to refrain from activities on the
extended continental shelf until the process of definition of the outer limits pursuant to Article 76 has been completed. The precise limits of the international
seabed area will remain uncertain until outer limits of extended continental
shelves are fully defined in accordance with the requirements of Article 76.
The LOSC requires coastal States to give due publicity to charts or lists of geographical coordinates of the outer limit lines of the continental shelf and to
deposit a copy of such charts or lists with the Authority’s Secretary-General.53
At the time of writing, there appears to be a low rate of compliance by coastal
States that have received recommendations from the Commission regarding
their submissions on the outer limits. By 2015 only Australia, Ireland, Mexico,
Niue and Philippines had deposited charts or lists with the Secretary-General.54

51
52
53
54

Rents from Resources through Royalties and Taxes, SPP Research Papers vol 5 (University
of Calgary, 2012), 5.
	Key Terms Report, n 32.
	Ibid.
	
L OSC, n 1, Art 84(2). This duty is in addition to the Art 76(9) duty of a State to deposit
charts, lists and other relevant information regarding the outer limits of the continental
shelf with the UN Secretary-General.
	Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article
166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISA Doc
ISBA/21/A/2, 3 June 2015, 2–3.
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The Secretary-General renewed calls for States to submit charts or lists of coordinates in his most recent annual report.55
The definition of the outer limits in a final and binding manner, on the basis
of recommendations from the Commission, has the benefit of legitimizing the
boundary between the extended continental shelf and the Area. This is important for the offshore oil and gas industry because it provides greater certainty
regarding the legality of their licenses. The occurrence of single geological
structures straddling international maritime boundaries is a realistic possibility, as demonstrated by the several instances of offshore joint development and
unitization activities around the world.56 Where a deposit is known to straddle
a licence area or maritime boundary, a longstanding good oilfield practice is
for the development of the resource to be unitized, that is developed in an
integrated manner.57 Licence holders would then come to agreement on their
respective shares of production and a model agreement will be developed for
this purpose.58
If such a situation were to arise, for example where a commercial hydrocarbon find straddles areas within and beyond national jurisdiction, there
could be three issues to consider. First, there would need to be consideration
of whether the resource should be developed on the basis of a joint development zone or, alternatively, by being unitized through the direct involvement
of the licence holders. In either case, there would need to be approval by the
Authority insofar as licence holders in the Area are concerned. The Authority
would likely need to develop regulations for this purpose, as it has for other
mineral resources. The Authority has an international governance structure
for licencing activities in the Area governed by Part XI of LOSC, and is overseen by Member States, who are also State Parties and include the coastal State
concerned. In turn, the coastal State could have sub-national units it would
need to involve in negotiations. Canada, a federal State, is a good example of
55 	Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 166,
paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/24/A/2
(29 May 2018), para 8.
56 	J Lang Weaver and DF Asmus, ‘Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields around the World: A
Comparative Analysis of National Laws and Private Contracts,’ (2006) 28 Houston Journal
of International Law 4. See also DM Ong, ‘Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil
and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice or Customary International Law?’, 93 American
Journal of International Law 771.
57 	JC Woodliffe, ‘International Unitization of an Offshore Gas Field,’ (1977) 26 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 338.
58 	Lang Weaver & Asmus, n 52, 22 et seq. For the model agreement, see Association of
International Petroleum Negotiators, available at <www.aipn.org/modelagreements/>.
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this because the regulation of the offshore is conducted by federal-provincial
boards.59 A consequence of a joint development zone or unitization scenario
is the need for regulators on both sides of the boundary to revisit the licences
in the areas adjacent to the boundary and to explore whether production policies and regulatory approaches require adjustment. Moreover, environment
protection standards may differ and would need to be reconciled for the operation in question.
Second, the payments or contributions in kind to be made by the coastal
State would logically apply to only a portion of the produced resource. If the
resource is unitized, the production units will be located in a manner to optimize production and it is conceivable that most of these might be placed on
one side of the boundary, rather than be evenly distributed on the shelf and
in the Area. The consequence is that the meaning of ‘site’ might not be clear
where most, if not all of the production units are placed in the Area, for the
purpose of determining the Article 82 eligible production.
Third, Article 142 of LOSC safeguards the rights of the coastal State by providing that ‘[A]ctivities in the Area, with respect to resource deposits in the
Area which lie across the limits of national jurisdiction, shall be conducted
with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of any coastal State across
whose jurisdiction such deposits lie.’60 The duty in the Convention is not reciprocal (and the Authority does not enjoy a counterpart right of protection), but
this author is of the view that there might be a duty concerning transboundary
resources at customary international law which could apply to the unilateral
actions of the coastal State, such as the duty to inform, consult and invite to
cooperate.61 Accordingly, although the Authority would be expected to consult the coastal State with regard to activities in the Area, an analogous duty
could be expected for the coastal State on the basis of general international
law. From the coastal State’s perspective, the type of activity in the Area adjacent to the boundary that could give rise to concern is where operations pose
a threat to the marine environment and resources of the EEZ or possibly even
to the sedentary species of the continental shelf. From the Authority’s perspective, perhaps the major concern is where the coastal State issues licences for
unilateral production from a transboundary resource.

59 	Spicer, n 36.
60 	
L OSC, n 1, Art 142(1).
61 	
Suriname/Guyana Arbitration, Permanent Court of Arbitration (Award),
17 September 2007, available at <www.pca-cpa.org/ showpage.asp?pag_id=1147>.
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Canada: First Past the Post?

Although Canada ratified the LOSC in 2003, it was unprepared for the implementation of Article 82. This is ironic because during UNCLOS III Canada
played an active role in the negotiation of the provision, both as a margineer
State seeking national gain while at the same time exploring options for a
potential compromise. In 1975, Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan J
MacEachen stated Canada’s commitment to revenue-sharing.62 This position
was pursued consistently by the Canadian Delegation led by Ambassador Alan
Beesley, which joined ranks with the United States’ and other delegations in
exploring options for a compromise through the establishment of a revenuesharing scheme primarily for the benefit of developing countries, in exchange
for agreement on Article 76.63 Negotiations were difficult and Canada, like
other delegations, had to compromise. In 1979 Ambassador Beesley underscored that revenue-sharing must be respectful of the coastal State’s sovereign
rights over the resources of the continental shelf and must not be set at a level
which is unreasonable, considering the high costs of deep water activities.64 In
1980, when compromise was not yet fully reached in the late hours of UNCLOS
III, Ambassador Beesley reiterated that position and was critical of the raising
of the royalty ceiling from five percent to seven percent. He therefore reserved
his delegation’s position ‘… not out of lack of generosity but because the suggested rate could make it uneconomic for Canada to explore and exploit its
continental margin in deep, cold water areas unless some safeguard provision
was developed to ensure that any revenue-sharing we could agree upon would
be practicable.’ The Canadian Delegation’s position was that Canada ‘… was
prepared to explore the possibility of financial contributions related to the net
revenues derived from the resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles
from shore.’65 However, ‘… the question of revenue-sharing will require further
discussion with a view to ensuring that the formula and the rate of contribution
62 	Secretary of State MacEachen stated that ‘… we are prepared to explore the possibility
of financial contributions related to the net revenues derived from the resources of the
continental shelf between 200 miles from the shore and the seaward edge of the continental margin. We are prepared to explore that possibility and we are prepared to
support that principle in order to promote an accommodation.’ Statement by the
Delegation of Canada, 2 April 1980, Doc A/CONF.62/WS/4, 10 April 1980, in Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, 9th Session,
3 March-4 April 1980 (United Nations, 1981), 101 at 102.
63 	Ibid.
64 	Ibid, 102.
65 	Ibid, Plenary, 125th meeting, 2 April 1980, at 8.
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will be both equitable and viable from the standpoint of both potential contributors and beneficiaries …’66 On the eve of the vote on the final package of
the LOSC in 1982, Secretary of State MacEachen stated that ‘[W]e must recognize, however, that there will be funds to dispense only if these resources prove
to be commercially exploitable.’67 This was a difficult compromise for the margineers, because other delegations were of the view that the royalty rate was
not proportionate to the margineers’ continental margin gains.
The difficulties Canada faced in negotiating Article 82 were only the beginning of a series of implementation challenges at the domestic level. According
to the Constitution of Canada, a province’s boundaries may not be changed
without its consent68 and that all lands, resources and royalties in provincial
territory at the time of Union belonged to the province.69 With the growing
interest in offshore development, the question arose as to whether the boundaries of coastal provinces included adjacent ocean space. Complicating this
question was that the various provinces joined confederation at different
dates, raising an additional issue with regard to their entitlements under international law at the time to determine what they imported into and when they
joined the Union.70 A case by cases analysis was essential. In 1967 the Supreme
Court of Canada determined that the territorial sea, its seabed and subsoil
off British Columbia (Vancouver Island) belonged to Canada, not the province.71 In 1984 the waters in Juan de Fuca Strait and Strait of Georgia between
Vancouver Island and the British Columbia mainland were determined to be
66 	Ibid, 9th Session, at 102.
67 	Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records, Resumed 11th
Session, 185th meeting, 6 December 1982 (United Nations, 1982).
68 	Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3 (UK), s 43: ‘An amendment to the Constitution
of Canada in relation to any provision that applies to one or more, but not all, provinces,
including (a) any alteration to boundaries between provinces, … may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada only where so
authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the legislative
assembly of each province to which the amendment applies.’
69 	Ibid, s 109: ‘All Lands, Mines, Minerals and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces
of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union, and all Sums then due or payable for such Lands, Mines, Minerals, or Royalties, shall belong to the several Provinces of
Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise,
subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the
Province in the same.’
70 	For example while Nova Scotia was a founding province of Confederation on 1 July 1867,
British Columbia joined confederation on 20 July 1871 and Newfoundland on 31 March 1949.
Newfoundland became Newfoundland and Labrador after a constitutional amendment
in 2001.
71 	Reference Re Ownership of Off Shore Mineral Rights [1967] SCR 792.
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encompassed within the limits of British Columbia when it joined the Union
in 1871 and were consequently provincial.72
Newfoundland (Newfoundland and Labrador since 2001) was the last province to join Canada, in 1949. This is significant because the province joined
the Union shortly after the Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf
of 1945. It will be recalled that the Proclamation triggered the development
of pertinent general international law to the effect that ‘the continental shelf
may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation and
thus naturally appurtenant to it’ and with the consequence that ‘the natural
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the
United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.’73 In a few years this concept attained the status of customary international law so that the rights of
the coastal State over the continental shelf belonged to that State ipso facto,
ipso iure and ab initio, that they were exclusive to it and that its title did not
depend on express claim, occupation or use.74 Newfoundland was of the view
that it joined Canada while possessing the territorial and other rights at international law appertaining to a State, and that these included the territorial sea
and continental shelf. In 1983 a Newfoundland Court of Appeal decision found
that the province had a territorial sea of three nautical miles when it joined
the Union.75 Continental shelf rights remained uncertain. A year later, the
Supreme Court of Canada decided that Newfoundland had not acquired continental shelf rights prior to joining the Union in 1949.76 The reasons were that
continental shelf rights granted by international law to a coastal State are not
in pith and substance proprietary, but are rather ‘an extraterritorial manifestation of external sovereignty.’77 In 1949 Newfoundland did not enjoy external
sovereignty as this power and right were enjoyed by the Crown in right of the
United Kingdom. The Supreme Court went on to hold that if Newfoundland
72 	Reference Re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas, [1984] 1
SCR 388.
73 	Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea
Bed of the Continental Shelf, 150 – Proclamation 2667–28 September 1945.
74 	North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 3 at para 19. For a commentary
on how the continental shelf doctrine attained the status of customary international law,
see ZJ Slouka, International Custom and the Continental Shelf: A Study in the Dynamics of
the Customary Rules of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1968).
75 	Reference Re Mineral and other Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf (1983), 145
DLR (3d) 9 (Nfld CA).
76 	Reference Re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland,
[1984] 1 SCR 86.
77 	Ibid.
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had acquired continental shelf rights prior to joining Canada, the Terms of
Union perpetuating natural resource rights in the Province at the date of Union
did not extend to continental shelf rights. Moreover, the Court went on to hold
that international law did not confer continental shelf rights in 1949 and that
such rights ‘were not indisputably recognized before the Geneva Convention
of 1958,’ and while coastal States enjoyed these rights retroactively, they ‘do not
have a retroactive effect capable of assisting Newfoundland.’78
The Supreme Court’s decision did not sit well with the Province. While
the legal basis of the dispute appeared to have been resolved by the Supreme
Court, the issue of rights to the shelf’s resources continued as a major
political problem. During judicial proceedings, other provinces, including
neighbouring Nova Scotia, adjacent to which is a large extended continental
shelf, intervened to advocate in favour of provincial rights. The differences
between Newfoundland and Labrador and the federal government were finally
resolved in a political settlement that was mirrored in federal and provincial
legislation in 1987 and 1990.79 The federal government agreed that the regulation of offshore activities would occur through federal-provincial boards.
Canada agreed that the royalties from offshore production would be levied by
the federal government and equal amounts would be paid to the provinces, as
if production occurred in the provinces.80 The consequence of this legal fiction
is that the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador legislated the levying of
royalties and which it retains.81
Somehow Article 82 did not feature in the history of the federal-provincial
disputes, with the consequence that the political and legal settlements omitted
reference to the potential role of the LOSC provision. Several rounds of calls to
bid were issued as a matter of course with no mention of the royalty applying
to licence areas outside 200 nautical miles.82 The 2012 Mizzen discovery on
78 	Ibid.
79 	
Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, SC 1987, c 3;
Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, RSNL 1990,
c C-2. There was a similar settlement with Nova Scotia: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore
Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, SC 1988, c 28; Canada-Nova Scotia
Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act, 1987 c 3.
80 	The responsible federal government department is Natural Resources Canada. See Natural
Resources Canada, 2014–2015 Departmental Performance Report (Canada, 2015), 57, available at <http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/performancereports/files/
dpr-2014-15/NRCan-DPR2014-15_e.pdf>.
81 	Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, RSNL 1990, c P-10.
82 	Early licences on the extended continental shelf are discussed by Chircop and Marchand,
n 4, at 281.
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the extended continental shelf off Newfoundland and Labrador was on the
basis of a licence issued by the Canada-Newfoundland & Labrador Offshore
Petroleum Board and without including any reference to the Article 82 royalty.
The significance of Article 82 in Canada was flagged early in the scholarly
literature.83 It was observed that Canada could face difficulties in the implementation of the provision, not only due to the uncertainty of the terminology
in the provision, but also, and most especially, because of the political understanding reached between the federal and provincial governments with respect
to the offshore royalty regime. The oil and gas industry enters into agreements
for prospecting, exploration, development and production, in response to original calls to tender, and production agreements would be expected to subsist
for decades.
The first federal official notice of the potential application of Article 82 with
regard to licenses on the extended continental shelf in the Northwest Atlantic
was made only in 2013,84 likely as a result of the Beijing Workshop of experts
and the recommendation to the Authority to call upon State Parties to consider taking steps for implementation.85 While differences between the federal
and Newfoundland and Labrador governments remained behind closed doors
for much of the time until then, they are now out in the open, in dispute and
with no solution announced, or in sight.86 The federal position is that the
Article 82 royalty should be levied from royalties on production, which at this
time are enjoyed exclusively by the province.87 Newfoundland and Labrador
considers this as Canada’s obligation.88 Natural Resources Canada, the federal
government organization primarily responsible with regard to royalty management, has made the issue an object of focused study. Its plans and priorities
83 	A Chircop and B Marchand, ‘Oceans Act: Uncharted Seas for Offshore Development in
Atlantic Canada?’ (2001) 24 Dalhousie Law Journal 23 at 30–32.
84 	‘The Board [Canada-Newfoundland & Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board] informs prospective bidders for these parcels, which are entirely or partially beyond Canada’s 200
nautical mile zone, that it has been advised by the Government of Canada that, in order
to meet obligations arising pursuant to article 82 of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, additional terms and conditions may be applied through legislation,
regulations, amendments to licences or otherwise.’ Call for Bids No. NL13–01 (Area ‘C’ –
Flemish Pass), The Newfoundland and Labrador Gazette, vol 88(23), 7 June 2013, at 213.
85 	Beijing Workshop Report, n 21, 24.
86 	‘Ottawa, N.L. unsure who will pay UN tax on new oil finds’, CBC News, 28 October
2013, available at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/ottawa-n-l
-unsure-who-will-pay-un-tax-on-new-oil-finds-1.2251838>.
87 	Ibid.
88 	Ibid.
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for 2015–2016 included ‘developing a domestic mechanism to implement
Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.’89 However,
the current 2018–2019 departmental plan makes no mention of continuing
work on Article 82.90 Deliberations on a solution appear to be on hold, possibly because production on the extended continental shelf is not imminent.
The performance of Article 82 as a treaty obligation is clearly Canada’s
responsibility as a State in international law, and this is confirmed in the country’s constitutional law.91 As observed earlier, domestic law issues that impede
implementation may not be invoked to avoid the international obligation.92
Thus the onus to develop a solution lies with the federal government. The
federal government is bound by a political accord and related legislation concluded three decades ago. The domestic solution would have to be more than
a simple amendment of pertinent federal and provincial legislation. Canada
may well have to explore a political solution first, followed by legislative steps,
perhaps not dissimilar to the political settlement concluded in the wake of the
Supreme Court of Canada Reference that rendered a decision unpalatable to
Newfoundland. In that settlement the federal government was generous and
relinquished royalty receipts to the province, thus enabling the offshore industry in the Northwest Atlantic to be launched. This renewed scenario means the
federal government would bear the principal responsibility for Article 82. This
route could provoke negative reactions from other provinces, in particular oilproducing provinces, because it could be perceived as a subsidy for provincial
production of offshore oil and gas that is not similarly enjoyed by land-based
producers.
If the federal government insists on clawing back domestic royalties currently levied by Newfoundland and Labrador or by introducing a surcharge
royalty or levy on current operators, it is possible additional issues could arise.
In addition to increasing uncertainty in the Atlantic offshore industry at a time
when revenues are low because of low oil prices, there could be the realistic prospect of prolonged federal-provincial litigation. In respect to the latter,

89 	Natural Resources Canada, Reports on Plans and Priorities, 2015–2016, Strategic Outcome
1, Sub-Program 1.1.3: Energy Market Regulation and Information, available at <http://
www.nrcan.gc.ca/plans-performance-reports/rpp/2015-16/17006>.
90 	Natural Resources Canada, 2018–19 Departmental Plan, available at <https://www.nrcan
.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/plansperformancereports/dpr/2018-19-DP-NRCan
-EN.pdf>.
91 	Constitution Act, n 68, s 132.
92 	Vienna Convention, n 17, Art 27.

Aldo Chircop - 9789004391567
Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2021 04:41:56PM
via Dalhousie University

Implementation of Article 82 of the UNCLOS

393

operators would be faced with an additional expense that could weigh on
the commercial viability of expensive operations in the deep waters of the
extended continental shelf, essentially recalling Secretary of State McEachen’s
warning about the challenges of Article 82.
It is possible that in the larger scheme, the Article 82 levy, applied over and
above existing royalties, might not be perceived as a major issue by the first
industry movers on the Atlantic extended continental self. In the alternative,
i.e., if it were to become an issue, a practical way forward could be to distinguish between pre-2013 and post-2013 calls to bid licensees. Tenderers to the
latter call received notice of Article 82 and can be considered as forewarned,93
as have subsequent responders to subsequent calls for bids, most recently in
2016.94 They would be in a position to anticipate future production cost scenarios against the backdrop of domestic and Article 82 royalties. Pre-2013 calls
to bid licensees could be addressed differently because they were not put on
notice at the time they placed their bids. The federal government would either
absorb the cost or enter into discussions with Newfoundland and Labrador
to explore a cost-sharing arrangement. However, the latter is not likely politically and economically realistic because the economy of Newfoundland and
Labrador has consistently had the highest unemployment levels in the country and its heavy reliance on single resource industries, initially fisheries and
more recently oil, makes it especially vulnerable to external market and environmental factors.
6

Conclusion

Article 82 poses implementation challenges for both coastal States and the
International Seabed Authority. This chapter has discussed the challenges
faced by coastal States, with a particular focus on Canada. Although offshore
exploration licences have been issued by a few States, Canada appears to be
the first LOSC Party to issue significant discovery licences for areas on the
extended continental shelf. While Canada has taken domestic steps to study
how domestic implementation will affect the internal royalty arrangements, it
will need to address the political and economic impacts in a fair and practical
93 	Call for Bids No. NL13–01, n 84.
94 	The most recent call repeated the notice in the 2013 call almost verbatim. See ‘C-NLOPB
Announces 2016 Calls for Bids,’ 2 April 2016, available at <http://www.cnlopb.ca/news/
nr20150331.php>.
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manner, and to do so in the near future to ensure that there will be a smooth
transition from discovery to production licences.
Being first entails a special responsibility for Canada. It places Canada in a
leadership role and implies a responsibility to establish a good implementation precedent. The precedent has two dimensions. First, the construction of
key terms in the first two paragraphs of Article 82 is a matter ‘concerning the
interpretation or application’ of LOSC, and while the coastal State may develop
a particular interpretation, it has to be reasonable and acceptable to other
LOSC State Parties, in other words it reflects the quid pro quo of Articles 76 and
82. Second, the first State to implement Article 82 will need also to develop
a good working relationship with the Authority, because that State and the
Authority will be engaged in a long-term relationship.
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